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A Question of Enumerated Powers:
Constitutional Issues Surrounding
Federal Ownership of the
Public Lands
ALBERT W. BRODIE*
[4s President] I plan to emphasize the powers granted to the federal
government, and those reserved to the states.
-President Ronald Reagan
Inauguaration Day, 1981
President Reagan has previously identified himself as a "sage-brush "
rebel The question of federal control over public lands may soon be
before the courts. In this article, the author advances the proposition
that thefederal government may not have a constitutional basis to con-
trol public lands for other than enumeratedpurposes.
The power of the federal government to own and control public
lands within the states has been a source of legal and political conflict
since our early days as a nation. Although questions regarding the ex-
ercise of this power never have lain dormant, controversy surrounding
the propriety of such federal ownership recently has been raised anew,
on a scale and with an intensity perhaps greater than at any time in our
history.
B.A., 1972, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1976, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law. Member, State Bar of California. The author is engaged in the appel-
late practice of law in Sacramento, California.
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The catalyst for such controversy has been the passage of legislation
in the Congress, chiefly the Land Management Act of 1976 and its
progeny, which, for the first time in our history, set forth a unified,
comprehensive plan for federal retention and control of the public
lands.' This legislation has greatly strengthened federal control over
the lands and correspondingly has stripped the states chiefly affected by
the legislation of jurisdictional power over these areas.2
The western states have responded with the adoption of various bills
that seek to offset the effects of these Congressional enactments and
declare the right of each state to possession of the federally owned and
managed public lands within its borders. Statutes challenging federal
authority already have been approved by Nevada, California, Arizona,
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.' Among
the issues raised by this federal-state controversy is the question of
whether the federal government has the power to exert dominion and
control over the public lands. This article will suggest that, based upon
records from the period of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitu-
tional Debates, early case law, and from basic concepts of sovereignty
within the federal system, no such power was conferred upon the cen-
tral government under the Constitution, and the exercise of such con-
trol properly is opposed by the legislatures of the western states.
This article first will review the early history behind the federal prop-
erty clauses, and then will recap the three major theories advanced con-
cerning the nature of the federal right to own and control public lands.
The article will conclude that none of the three theories is completely
accurate, since each fails to properly recognize the distinction between
the federal government's roles as both a sovereign and proprietor. Af-
ter discussing this distinction, the article will postulate its own theory of
the nature of federal ownership of public land, based on the enumer-
ated powers of the federal government and the reserved powers of the
state. As is the case in any question involving Constitutional interpre-
tation, the answer to the present conflict is rooted in the past, in the
early history of the United States with regard to the original territories.
!. See generally Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §102(a), 90
Stat. 2744 (1976).
2. The overwhelming majority of the public lands are located in the 13 western-most states
(including Alaska and Hawaii).
3. The bills adopted to date include: Arizona SB 1012, effective July 14, 1980; California
AB 2302, effective July 29, 1980; Colorado HJR 1006, effective April 8, 1980; Hawaii SR 266,
effective April 15, 1980; Idaho SCR 129, effective March 14, 1980; Nevada AB 413, effective July
1, 1979 (the much publicized "Sagebrush Rebellion"); New Mexico HB 79, effective May 14, 1980;
Utah SB 5, effective July 1, 1980; Wyoming HB 6, effective March 10, 1980.
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A. The Controversy Over The Western Territories
Disposition of the western territory was a source of controversy long
before our existence as a nation. The Proclamation of 1763, which con-
fiscated the public lands for the benefit of the English Crown, was one
of the chief causes of the American Revolution.4
After the thirteen colonies had declared their independence from
Great Britain, one of the major stumbling blocks to ratification of the
Articles of Confederation was the battle over ownership of the western
lands. This problem arose because seven of the former colonies (Mas-
sachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and New York) had received title to vast tracts of territory
west of the Appalachian Mountains, either by grant from the King of
England or by treaty with the Indian tribes. The remaining six colonies
(Rhode Island, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
and Delaware) had acquired no such claims.5
This latter group, led by representatives from the state of Maryland,
fought for a release of the areas in the west by the "landed" states
throughout the Confederation period. The steadfast insistence of Ma-
ryland and her companions in the struggle to force a divesting of these
territories was due to their fear of being overshadowed in the new
union by massive states, which could exert undue domination and con-
trol over their smaller neighbors.6
On March 1, 1781, pursuant to a resolution of Congress, the state of
New York surrendered its western claims to the Confederation, for
purposes of providing a common fund to pay for expenses incurred by
the revolution and with the express provision that the land was to be
held in trust by the Congress until such time as the land could be
formed into new and independent states in the federal alliance and "for
no other use or purpose whatsoever.
' 7
Three years later, on March 1, 1784, the state of Virginia also en-
trusted its western lands to the Confederation. This grant contained
language similar to that set forth in the cession of New York and in-
cluded a condition "that the territory so ceded shall be laid out and
formed into States. . . and that the States so formed shall be distinct
4. The Declaration of Independence itself states, in listing the colonial grievances against
the British monarch, that "He has endeavored to prevent the population of these states; for that
purpose, obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage
their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands." See also L.
GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION 139-40 (2d ed. 1962).
5. See T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 59-60 (1884).
6. See 3 WAY & GIDEON, JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1788, at 281-83
(1823) (see the instructions given to the delegates from Maryland on May 21, 1779) [hereinafter
cited as WAY & GIDEON].
7. 3 WAY & GIDEON, supra note 6, at 582-86.
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republican States, and admitted members of the Federal Union; having
the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other
States."8
These cessions were followed by subsequent divestings, made for
similar purposes, by Massachusetts on April 19, 1785, 9 Connecticut on
September 13, 1786,10 and by South Carolina, which ceded part of its
territory on August 9, 1787." Additional cessions of territory were of-
fered to the Confederation by both North Carolina and Georgia, but
the terms of their grants were found to be unsatisfactory to the Con-
gress, and were subsequently rejected.' 2 A complete surrendering of
the western lands by North Carolina and Georgia was not effected until
after the ratification of the Constitution.'
3
After the members of the Confederation had issued grants of these
territories, a new dilemma arose. Under the Articles of Confederation,
the central government was not empowered to own any land within the
former colonies and had no constitutional authority to form them into
states.' 4 The Confederation Congress was "without the least color of
constitutional authority" to receive these areas from the states.' 5 The
Articles of Confederation specifically stated that "no State shall be de-
prived of territory for the benefit of the United States."'
16
The inability of the Congress under the Confederation either to own
or dispose of real property were two of the deficiencies that the Framers
sought to cure at the time of the calling of the Constitutional Conven-
tion in 1787. Their solutions to these problems are integral components
of any discussion involving the ability of the federal government to
own or control public lands within the states.
B. The Property Clauses
As a result of the defects that were present in the Articles of Confed-
eration, three clauses were debated and subsequently adopted in the
body of the Constitution that deal directly with the power and ability of
the federal government to own, control, and dispose of land.
8. 4 WAY & GIDEON, supra note 6, at 342-44.
9. 4 WAY & GIDEON, supra note 6, at 501-04.
10. 4 WAY & GIDEON, supra note 6, at 645-48, 697-98.
11. 4 WAY & GIDEON, supra note 6, at 769-72.
12. 4 WAY & GIDEON, supra note 6, at 523-25, 834-35.
13. T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 65 (1884).
14. See J. MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 215 (Int'l ed.
1920) [hereinafter cited as MADISON]. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43.
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38.
16. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX.
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L The Enclave Clause
The first of these clauses empowers the federal government to estab-
lish federal enclaves for its governmental seats, erection of forts, arse-
nals, and so forth. 7 This provision, hereinafter referred to as the
"Article I" clause or the "enclave" clause, has raised little controversy
about the constitutionality of federal ownership. Although there have
been a number of cases dealing with the authority of the state govern-
ments to impose taxes on such property, the propriety of federal juris-
diction and control over these areas has never seriously been
challenged in the courts. 8
The reason for such acceptance is that it generally has been under-
stood, from the birth of the Republic, that the central government of
necessity must have certain lands for its exclusive use to carry out its
enumerated powers. Furthermore, it has been understood that the fed-
eral entity must be able to control and protect such lands, separate and
independent from the jurisdictions of the various states. This provision
was inserted in the Constitution by the Framers as an enunciation of,
and a solution to, that need.' 9
During the Constitutional debates pertaining to this particular provi-
sion, Elbridge Gerry, a delegate from Massachusetts, objected that
"this power might be made use of to enslave any particular State by
buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a
means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the general gov-
ernment."20 Thereafter, Rufus King, also from Massachusetts, pro-
posed that the insertion of the words, "by the consent of the Legislature
of the State" would eliminate this danger and make the exercise of the
power safe.2 '
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 17 provides:
To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding
ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress,
become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority
over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same
shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings ....
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Yellow Cab, 321 U.S. 383 (1944); Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department
of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1943); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Surplus
Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
19. The necessity of such a power was shown during the Revolutionary War, when a group
of rebellious colonial troops forced the Congress to flee from Philadelphia to New Jersey. See
Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 529 (1885); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 123 (4th ed. 1873) [hereinafter cited as STORY]. See
also THE FEDERALIST No. 43.
20. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 510 (Revised
4th ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
21. FARRAND, supra note 20, at 510.
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2. The Article IV Property Clauses
Unlike the Article I property clause, the other two property clauses
in the Constitution that pertain to the formation of new states22 and the
regulation of territories23 have been the sources of most of the contro-
versy involving federal control over real property within the states; it is
to these clauses that much of this discussion will be directed.
The adoption of the Article IV property clauses certainly was be-
cause, under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress had no power
to receive land or to admit new states into the union created by the
former colonies. To cure this defect it became necessary at the Consti-
tutional Convention to make provision for the admission of any terri-
tory that came into possession of the central government as a member
of the new union of states.
C The Admission of New States Under the Constitution
In 1791, pursuant to the authority vested in it by Article IV of the
Constitution, the First Congress duly admitted into the Union the state
of Vermont. This new state was created from territory ceded to the
federal government by New Hampshire and New York. Thereafter
followed the admission of the states of Kentucky in 1792 and Tennes-
see in 1796. Notably, no public lands were withheld from these three
states formed during the first years of the Constitution.
24
Then, beginning with the admission of Ohio in 1803, Congress began
imposing certain conditions and restraints concerning the admission of
new states. The most pertinent of these conditions were agreements
made by the territorial legislatures to acquiesce to the retention of cer-
tain tracts of federal lands that had not been ceded outright to these
newly admitted sovereigns. The agreements additionally provided that
the new states would never interfere with "the primary disposal" of
these lands by the United States."
22. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall
be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed
by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the
Legislature of the States concerned as well as the Congress.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §3, cl. 1.
23. The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the territory or other property belongin& to the United States; and noth-
ing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §3, cl. 2.
24. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 286-88 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as GATES].
25. GATES, supra note 24, at 288-316. The language pertaining to the disposal of the land
originated from terms contained in the re-enactment of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 by the
First Congress. See I Stat. 50.
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With the exceptions of Maine and Texas, these retentions were im-
posed upon every new state, up to and including Hawaii, and remain in
effect to this date.26 Although there have been additional grants of
property by the states to the federal government, the most notable of
these being much of the land composing the national park system, the
great majority of the public land remains from the cessions made at the
time of admission of new states to the Union.
D. The Growth of Federal Power Over the Public Lands
As has been shown, the first public lands were ceded to the govern-
ment of the United States by the former colonies as a result of the jeal-
ousies and concerns of the smaller states that they would be overcome
by their larger neighbors. These lands were given to Congress to sell in
order to pay for debts incurred in the Revolutionary War, with the un-
derstanding that they would be formed into new states. However, the
more years that passed after the ratification of the Constitution, and the
greater the territory of the United States became' as the result of pur-'
chase, war, and annexation, the more the power of the federal govern-
ment over these areas increased.
Initial judicial decisions limited the ability of the United States to
exert control over the public lands. In an early Circuit Court case, the
federal magistrate held that such ownership by the United States gov-
ernment did not prohibit a state from condemning certain of these
properties for purposes of a railroad right of way.28 Other court deci-
sions held that the United States had no power to exercise jurisdiction
over public areas dedicated to the people of a state, 29 nor could it grant
a patent to land under navigable waters in a state.30
The enumerated ability of the United States to dispose of the public
lands was one of the first powers confirmed by the courts. The
Supreme Court held that only a patent from the United States, and no
grant by the individual states themselves, could vest title to the public
lands.3 The exclusive power to dispose of the land later was held to
include the ability to lease such land for a specified time32 and to pun-
26. GATES, supra note 24, at 288-316.
27. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CON-
GRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 19-20 (1970). See also PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS 10 (1977).
28. United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 27 Fed. Cas. 686, 692-93 (1855).
29. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836).
30. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
31. Irwine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 558 (1857); Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
169 (1846); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839); Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
436 (1839).
32. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
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ish trespassers on the public lands.33
In 1871, in another case involving title to land, the Supreme Court
boldly proclaimed that "[w]ith respect to the public domain, the Con-
stitution vests in Congress the power of disposition and of making all
needful rules and regulations. Thatpower is subject to no limitation. "I'
Thereafter followed rulings that the states could not impose a tax
upon public lands owned by the United States unless such a power was
reserved under the deed of cession." The question of the taxing power
was limited further to the point that a state could not tax the land of the
United States, whether or not a reservation had been made without the
consent of the United States.
3 6
With respect to the acceptance of additional public lands not origi-
nally ceded by the states, in 1895 the Court held that the United States
was empowered to receive such lands for purposes of a military ceme-
tery.37 In so ruling, the Court tied this ability by the thinnest of threads
to the Article I war powers.3"
One year later, in a case that empowered the United States to pro-
hibit an individual from building fences on private property partially
enclosing the public lands, the Court all but vested plenary authority
over the public lands in the federal government.39
Subsequent rulings completed the vesting of this plenary power. The
Supreme Court declared the United States had the ability to prohibit
unauthorized grazing on the public lands,40 to bar the acquisition of
rights of way by eminent domain over the public lands unless granted
in conformity with federal law,4" to punish individuals for building
fires too close to the public lands, 42 to enable a federal official to kill
33. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1851).
34. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1872) (emphasis added).
35. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
36. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886). These early decisions appear to unnec-
essarily expand the rule prohibiting state taxation of federal property. The rule no doubt has
application with reference to those instrumentalities necessary to carry out the functions assigned
to the federal government. However, taxation of the public lands arguably is not a tax upon such
instrumentalities. The validity of such an argument is shown by the relatively recent passage of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-565, 90 Stat. 2670 (1976).
37. United States v. Gettysburgh Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
38. Id
39. While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate
against nuisances within a State, which it would have within a Territory, we do not think
the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the
protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is
ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely at its own
protection. A different rule would place the public domain of the United States com-
pletely at the mercy of state legislation.
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1897).
40. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
41. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
42. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
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wild deer that threatened the public lands, even though such killings
were in violation of state law,43 and to bar the applicability of state
insurance laws over a hotel built on public lands.' Additionally the
Court held that title in a state to land under non-navigable waters auto-
matically passed to the United States upon admission to statehood,45
that the United States could accept exclusive jurisdiction over land
ceded by the state for non-Article I purposes after admission,46 that
areas reserved by the federal government included the retention of
water rights necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation,
47
that Congress had the power to bar a state from destroying wild burros
that roamed on the public lands, 48 and, most recently, that the federal
government has the power to dictate to the states what public lands will
be returned to them, regardless of any state application made pursuant
to their respective enabling acts or under federal statute.49 This rout of
the states' power to govern the public lands within their borders, in any
fashion, appears to be complete.
With so many powers now vested in the federal government in these
areas, what remains to the states? Indeed, the scope of federal control
over the public lands is now so extensive that there appears to be little
authority remaining in the states themselves, other than perhaps service
of their civil and criminal processes. °
It is this steadily increasing control, coupled with a stated policy of
retention, that has inflamed the western states and has precipitated the
current struggle over federal ownership of public lands. The contro-
versy has generated numerous theories concerning the propriety of
such federal power over public lands, and it is around these theories
that the battlelines have been drawn in the current federal-state con-
flict.
THEORIES PERTAINING TO FEDERAL OWNERSHIP
OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
Among the arguments that have been proposed either for defending
or qualifying the right of the federal government to own and control
the public lands, three predominant theories have emerged over the
43. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
44. Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929).
45. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
46. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
47. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
48. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Andrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. 715, 739 (1980); Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 520,
(1980) rehearing denied, 100 S. CL 3051.
50. For an illustration of such retained jurisdiction, see 1 JuRISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AR-
EAS WITHIN THE STATES 28-29 (USGPO 1956).
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past several years. These theories will be set forth below and briefly
analyzed for the purpose of examining the propriety of such control of
property by the central government.
A. The Ownershio Theory
The first of these arguments is that the United States has been vested
with complete powers of ownership, 6ontrol, and disposition of public
lands. It postulates that the federal government never was obligated to
grant to any of the states admitted subsequent to the adoption of the
Constitution the right to ownership of any of the soil within their bor-
ders."' This claim is predicated upon the fact that, in the original ces-
sions made during the Confederation period, territory was granted to
the central government with the understanding that the western lands
were to be transferred to the United States and administered by it for
the benefit of all the states then in existence.52 This claim is based in
large part on the arguments made by Maryland, Delaware, and other
states that had no claim to the western lands that land obtained by the
blood of every state should in turn belong to all of the states.53 As to
the lands acquired subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution, in-
cluding those obtained by the Louisiana Purchase, the Mexican War,
the cession of Alaska, and the Gadsden Purchase, the argument
changes in emphasis slightly. These lands, having been procured by
funds received from taxpayers of all the states, should be held by the
federal government for the whole nation.54
Proponents of this theory argue that "[it is quite logical, therefore,
that the United States should retain or dispose of its public lands for
the benefit of all the people rather than the transfer of ownership of
those lands to a particular state. ' 55 There are, however, a number of
questions about the correctness of such a theory. Initially, it should be
remembered that although the states with no title claim to the western
lands insisted upon a transfer of the western lands to the Confedera-
tion, a primary purpose behind such a transfer was to guarantee that
these states would not be dominated by their larger landed neighbors.
It is unlikely that any of the former colonies would have agreed to
place total control over these areas in the central government. It seems
illogical that the states would have struggled to limit the size of the
51. Clark, National Sovereignty and Dominion Over Lands Underlying the Ocean, 27 Tax. L.
REv. 140 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Clark]. See also BLM News Release of 10/31/79, at 4 (Sec-
retary Andrus raises the same contentions).
52. Clark, supra note 51, at 149.
53. Clark, supra note 51, at 149.
54. Clark, supra note 51, at 151.
55. Clark, supra note 51, at 151.
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state governments, only to allow the national government to be un-
bounded.
It also should be noted that Congress withheld no lands from the first
three states admitted under the Constitution56 and subsequently surren-
dered the overwhelming majority of the public lands in all the states
east of the 100th meridian, reserving control over vast tracts only in the
western states. This would not appear to have been a policy aimed at
benefiting all the people of the nation, but rather one aimed at benefit-
ing those individual states within whose boundaries the land was situ-
ated. Once the federal government had divested itself of these areas,
either to individuals or to the respective states, these lands were re-
moved from their central control and placed in the hands of local au-
thorities. It is inconsistent to argue that western lands are to be held for
the benefit of all the people, but that eastern, southern, northern, or
midwestern lands were not intended to be so held.
If this theory is correct, then arguably all of the lands acquired by the
federal government should have been held in perpetuity by Congress.
Such an argument appears to be but a justification for the retention of
the western lands, an afterthought based upon facts as they existed,
rather than an enunciation of long-standing constitutional doctrine.
If, in fact, the federal government was supposed to hold all of the
lands for all of the people, one wonders why the territory of the Atlan-
tic states was exempted from such ownership. To justify such a theory,
all of the land in the United States should have been thrown into a
hotchpot, and the states as such should have been abolished, except
insofar as they could serve as administrative components of the central
government. Otherwise, the theory becomes one of eastern parochial-
ism, with all of the lands being held for all the people, with the excep-
tion of the land in the original thirteen colonies, which are held only by
those respective states.
It should be noted that such a plan to abolish the states was proposed
at the Constitutional Convention and was rejected by the delegates.
57
The above argument represents an enunciation of the same theory, but
in a modified form, and warrants similar rejection.
B. The Trust Theory
A second theory, one that has been propounded by Nevada and
other western states in their struggle to obtain the return of their public
lands from the federal government, states that public lands were in-
56. See GATES, supra note 24, at 286-88.
57. MADISON, supra note 14, at 126.
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tended to be held in trust by the federal government for only a limited
period of time, after which they were to be vested in the respective
states. The argument presented is that the central authority now has
violated the terms of that trust, based on its recently stated policies of
retention, and that such a violation mandates the immediate return of
the lands to the states. 8
This theory is based .in large part on language in a number of
Supreme Court cases that refers to these lands as being held in trust by
the government of the United States.59 The use of the word "trust" in
labelling the interest of the United States in the public lands, however,
was both imprecise and unfortunate. For in doing so the Court used
familiar but inappropriate language, language that has created confu-
sion up to the present day. There can be little doubt that a trust was in
fact created at the time of the original cessions of western lands under
the Confederation. However, the states placed the lands in trust only
until the area could be formed into new and independent states. 60 No
language of trust appears in the property clauses of the Constitution,
nor was the creation of a trust in these lands ever discussed at the time
of the Constitutional Convention. 61 If the Framers knew of the then-
current trust status of the territories ceded to the Congress, which they
most certainly did,62 one wonders why they did not transfer language
of trust into the body of the Constitution itself. The answer seems ap-
parent. No trust was created under the Constitution because of the
provisions of Article IV, which gave the new government the power,
heretofore denied to the central authority, to create states out of the
territory received by it and to rule those lands prior to their inclusion in
the federal union. Such power obviated the need for a trust provision
for, with the creation of the Constitution, the necessity of a trust fiction,
created by the inability of the Confederation to hold land in its own
right, disappeared; a system had now been formulated for the divesting
and disposition of these lands by the Congress.
63
A final problem with the trust theory is that it is subject to the doc-
trine of laches since it is an equitable argument. Such a defense would
pose no problem if the violation of the trust had only occurred recently.
58. See Legislative Commission of the Legislative Counsel Bureau, State of Nevada, Means
of Deriving Additional State Benefits From Public Lands, Bulletin No. 77-6, at 1-39 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Nevada Bulletin].
59. Nevada Bulletin, supra note 58, at 3.
60. See 3 WAY & GIDEON, supra note 6, at 582-86.
61. MADISON, supra note 14, at 251-59, 487-96. Three major debates took place in the Con-
stitutional Convention regarding the admission of new states, on July 14 and on August 29 and 30,
1787. No indication of the creation of a trust appears in the records of these debates.
62. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 595 (1967).
63. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
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However, other federal enactments, particularly those that closed the
frontier and halted the divesting of the public lands in the 1930's, raise
the spectre of just such an equitable defense.'
C. The Equal Footing Theory
The last of these theories, also forwarded by the western states in
their current struggle with the federal government, postulates that each
new member of the union is entitled to be admitted on the basis of
constitutional equality of right and power with the original states.
Hence, the federal government cannot withhold land from any of the
states admitted subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution, since it
had not been allowed to withhold any such lands from what had been
the original thirteen colonies.65
Of the three theories mentioned above this is the one, perhaps, that
most closely reflects the intent of the Framers of the Constitution.
However, there are also problems in this argument with historical and
constitutional interpretation and with the emphasis placed on the re-
spective rights of the state and federal governments.
The doctrine of equal footing traditionally has been interpreted as
referring to the political equality of the states and not equality as it
pertains to proprietary control over real property.6 The equal status of
the western lands was a source of bitter controversy during the drafting
of the Constitution. Delegates from some of the states feared that the
growth of the new states eventually would subjugate the Atlantic states
to political subservience by the after-included members of the Union.67
Other founders foresaw that it would be unwise to preclude the new
states from having an equal political voice in the new nation, thereby
ignoring one of the ideals for which the revolution had been waged.68
A provision guaranteeing the equality of the states was introduced at
the Constitutional Convention, but was omitted in the final draft.69
However, a doctrine of the political equality of the states subsequently
was formulated by the Supreme Court and has been applied consist-
ently since the early days of the Constitution.70
64. Exec. Order No. 9526, 10 Fed. Reg. 2423 (1945), U.S. Code Cong. Service 1222 (1945).
65. Nevada Bulletin, supra note 58, at 39-43.
66. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950); Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245
(1900).
67. 1 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 583.
68. 1 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 578-79.
69. 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 454.
70. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Ill., 146
U.S. 387, 434 (1892); Knight & United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Weber v.
Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57,65 (1873); Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
589, 609 (1845).
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The equal footing doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court has en-
compassed in part the right of a state to control the lands within its
boundaries. However, that doctrine has been inexplicably limited to
include only the shores of navigable waters in a state.7' Therefore, the
concept of equal footing has taken on a character, definition, and
meaning which are traditionally different than that proposed by the
western states. However, the principle behind this theory is viable in so
far as it pertains to the inherent right of a state to control the land
within its borders.72
This right does not stem from any discretionary power deemed to
have been given to the federal goverment to grant these lands to the
states. Rather it arises by way of the right and necessity of a state to
assume jurisdiction over these areas when the power of the federal gov-
ernment in this regard ceases, namely upon the admission of that state
into the Union under operation of the Constitution.
With this in mind, it is necessary to view the respective sovereign
functions of the state and central governments within the federalist sys-
tem. Such functions have been outlined by the relative powers granted
to these entities under the Constitution.
THE UNITED STATES AS SOVEREIGN AND PROPRIETOR
In viewing the questions surrounding federal control over real prop-
erty, a distinction first must be drawn between those areas in which the
United States is deemed to be a "sovereign" and that property in which
it has been held to be but a "proprietor". No question is raised by this
article over federal control of the former; however, it is the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over the latter that is viewed as being inconsistent
with our system of government as conceived.
Sovereignty generally is accepted as being "the supreme, absolute
and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is gov-
erned," including the paramount political authority that encompasses
the full scope of both the internal and external affairs of a particular
state or nation.73
The federal system, as created, was to be one of "dual sovereignty";
neither the national nor state governments were to hold absolute au-
thority in all areas, because neither was conceived as sovereign in the
pure sense of the word. Instead, each was to be paramount in the fields
71. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1950); United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19, 30-31 (1946); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934).
72. See notes 65-71 and accompanying text supra.
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1568 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
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delegated to it by the Constitution.7 4 Therefore, when addressing is-
sues of central control in a given area, including jurisdiction of the
United States over the public lands, it is important to be mindful of
those powers given to the federal entity under the provisions of the
Constitution.
A. The Doctrine of Enumerated Powers
It is a fundamental principle of our federal system that the govern-
ment of the United States was founded and is to be maintained as one
of limited and enumerated powers as they have been propounded in
the Constitution.75 The doctrine of the enumerated powers of the fed-
eral government has a far more limiting effect with regard to the inter-
nal affairs of the nation than with its external affairs.
With respect to the latter field, particularly the ability to declare and
wage war, to make peace, to enter into treaties, and to maintain diplo-
matic relations with other nations, the powers of the United States are
indeed sovereign and supreme. These sovereign powers are not
granted only by the words of the Constitution itself,7 6 but are deemed
to have passed to the United States as a political body when the exter-
nal sovereignty of Great Britain over the colonies ceased.77 Even if the
powers in external affairs had not been granted by the Constitution,
they would nevertheless have been vested in the federal government as
concomitants of nationality.78 The only major impediments to the ex-
ercise of this power are specific prohibitions contained in the Constitu-
tion itself.
79
When the focus changes from one of external to internal affairs, how-
ever, it is clear that the federal government is not empowered to exert
74. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905).
75. In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, setting forth perhaps the definitive enuncia-
tion of this concept:
This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle,
that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have re-
quired to be enforced by all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it was
depending before the people, found it necesary to urge. That principle is now univer-
sally admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted is
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.
... If any one proposition could comand the universal assent of mankind, we might
expect it would be this-that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers,
is supreme within its sphere of action.
... Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
to that end, which are not pro-hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are coastitutional.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06, 421 (1819).76. U.S. COt ST. art. I, §8, art. II, §2.
77. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936).
78. Id. at 318.
79. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-14 (1964). See generally Reid v.Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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untrammelled sway in these areas; its powers in the national, as op-
posed to the international, sphere are not unbounded. The Framers of
the Constitution carved from the mass of legislative powers only those
which they thought wise to confer upon the general government. To
insure that there would be no confusion with regard to what was dele-
gated and what was retained, the national powers were duly enumer-
ated, "with the result that what was not embraced by the enumerated
powers remained vested in the state without change or impairment." 80
This concept of enumerated powers has particular importance with
respect to public lands. For if the central government has the power to
control these lands, it is clear that such power must stem from the con-
stitutional source that created the federal entity itself, and no other.
B. The Sovereign-Proprietor Dichotomy
It is beyond the scope of this article to catalogue completely the pres-
ent extent of federal control over all of the lands within its jurisdiction
in the 50 states.8' The extent and nature of this control varies from
state to state, and often from parcel to parcel. Differences in the type of
jurisdiction arise depending upon the terms of the various cessions or
reservations, whether the matter involved is in the criminal or civil area
of the law, the constitutional authority under which the land is deemed
to be held, the extent of jurisdiction accepted by the federal goverment,
and which particular federal agency exercises control over the area.
8 2
For purposes of this discussion, the lands owned and controlled by
the federal government will be divided into three major categories: the
federal enclaves, the territories, and the non-enclave public lands. Par-
amount in any discussion involving federal control over real property is
an evaluation of the powers of the federal government in these three
particular areas. A key point in this regard is the distinction that has
evolved between the central government acting in the capacity of a
"sovereign", as opposed to its acting as a "proprietor" over the land.
With this in mind, a brief discussion of federal power over Article I
property, as compared to Article IV property, is necessary.
Traditionally, the right to exercise jurisdiction over Article I prop-
erty, or the federal enclaves, has been viewed as being within the sole
province of the federal government. This view stems from the specific
enumerated power "to exercise exclusive legislation" over these areas,
80. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936).
81. See generally PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 10 (1977) (shows the United States government
as owning over 741 million acres of land, in all categories, comprising 32.6% of the real property in
the nation).
82. 1 JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES 3 (USGPO 1959).
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as set forth in the Article I property clause itself.83 The courts, from an
early date, defined this phrase as being the equivalent of "exclusive
jurisdiction" over such lands.84 As a result, federal power in these ar-
eas was viewed as being "in essence complete sovereignty."85 Such ju-
dicial interpretations, in effect, created mythical or imaginary federal
islands, or states within the states, inside the boundaries of the respec-
tive members of the Union themselves.
This view may be undergoing a process of revision, as evidenced by
recent cases in this area. In these cases, the Court specifically rejected
the "fiction of a state within a state," holding instead that the creation
of a federal enclave did not totally remove that area from the operation
of the laws of the local goverment.86
This new view'appears to recognize the Article I property as being a
part of the state and subject to its laws, except where those laws might
conflict with or impair the orderly functioning of the federal enclaves
themselves.87 In other words, the federal government has the ability to
exercise "exclusive" governmental jurisdiction over these areas, pursu-
ant to the powers which are deemed to be vested by the provisions of
Article I itself, but it is not absolutely necessary that it do so. There-
fore, as in other instances of concurrent jurisdiction between the federal
and state governments, if no such enactments are passed by the Con-
gress, state legislation pertaining to the given area will be allowed to
prevail.88 Such an interpretation is perhaps a more reasonable ap-
proach to the implementation of federal and state powers in this field
than is the "federal islands" concept and is arguably more in keeping
with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution.89
The right of exclusive jurisdiction includes not only the ability to
legislate over these areas, but the power to protect that property as
well. 9° At the time the Constitution was formed it was seen as vital to
the integrity of the central government that it not be dependent upon
any state for its existence or survival; it was for this reason that the
enclave clause ultimately was adopted.
83. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141 (1937).
84. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652 (1930); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 336, 388 (1818).
85. S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 562 (1946).
86. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Howard v. Commissioners of Louisville, 344
U.S. 624, 626-27 (1953).
87. 344 U.S. at 627.
88. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
89. For a discussion of the implications of Howard and Evans and of the intent of the fram-
ers in the drafting of the phrase "exclusive legislation," see D.E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITtTIONAL
POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE 163-66, 191-200 (1974).
90. See generall, Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944).
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This ability to exclude state laws from any application in the federal
enclaves, as has been stated above, stems from the grant of "exclusive
legislation" given to the United States over these areas. To a similar
degree, this supreme power of legislation and protection also exists in
the federal government with regard to the territories or those non-en-
clave properties which are owned by the United States prior to their
admission to statehood.
The ability of the federal government to exercise exclusive control
over the territories stems not from the Article I property clause, but
from the specific grant of authority "to make all needful rules and regu-
lations" respecting these areas set forth in Article IV, section 3, clause
2. Since there is no other government that can exercise jurisdiction
over the lands belonging to the United States while they are in a terri-
torial status, these lands are in fact tantamount to federal enclaves prior
to their admission into the union of states. The exclusive nature of
federal jurisdiction in this area clearly has been established, both by the
words of the Constitution and by case law.9'
With regard to the Article IV public lands, it is important to note
that the same grant of exclusive legislation which extends over the fed-
eral enclaves and, in effect, over the territories, does not pertain to non-
enclave property within the states themselves. Instead, federal legisla-
tive and jurisdictional powers over the public lands have been deemed
to originate from the Constitutional language to "make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the. . . other property of the United
States." 92
Such an interpretation of the language of Article IV has raised a per-
plexing dichotomy with regard to federal-state control over the public
lands. Upon its admission as a state, federal jurisdiction over real prop-
erty in a former territory is deemed to devolve to that new member of
the Union.93 This is not to say that the state also accedes to all title to
the lands formerly held by the federal government for, as we have seen,
it became a policy of the United States to reserve in itself title to certain
parcels of these lands after admission. The distinction that has devel-
oped is that the federal government, immediately upon admission of
the area to statehood, becomes a "proprietor" of any lands not ceded or
91. National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1879); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828). See generall, Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (II Wheat.)
523, 528 (1827).
92. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535 (1976); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128, 138 (1976); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 443 (1955); United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 404
(1917); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88
(1907).
93. 101 U.S. at 133.
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given to the states. In this capacity it is claimed to be similar to other
proprietors, but its powers as a "sovereign" cease to exist.
94
As the cases cited above have shown, the interpretation of these areas
as being "property" over which the federal government can "regulate"
has been drastically expanded with the passing of the years. The
United States is currently vested with the power to resist, by the exer-
cise of its legislative or executive authority or through proceedings in
the courts, any attempted interference with these lands by a state or
individual. The Congress also has been deemed to have the power to
protect, and, pursuant to recent legislation, to retain and manage the
public lands.
It is clear that federal control over the public lands is unlike that of
any proprietor in history. The difference between the United States as
"sovereign" and "proprietor" has been whittled away to the point
where it is now a distinction without substance. It is clear that Con-
gress, with the aid of the courts, has extended its purported proprietary
role to a point where it in fact exerts sovereign control over the public
lands, rather than merely exercising its claimed Constitutional author-
ity to make "needful rules and regulations" respecting these properties.
The exceptions have consumed the rule; regulation has become
supreme legislative jurisdiction in all but name only.
It is pure sophistry to contend that the states currently have any real
ability to govern, implement legislation, or exercise jurisdiction over
the public lands within their geographical limits. Furthermore, it is dif-
ficult to discern at the present time, especially in view of the recent
changes in Article I property doctrine, how federal control over its en-
claves and the territories differs from federal control over Article IV
property.
It is this "property regulation," this ability to own and control the
public lands, which appears foreign to the federal system of govern-
ment as originally conceived. Not only does such control impinge
upon the sovereign reserved powers of the states in this area, but it
additionally raises serious questions with regard to the constitutional
validity of such landholdings by the federal government. Before dis-
cussing the constitutional invalidity of such control, however, it is nec-
essary to consider the reserved powers of the state.
THE RESERVED POWERS OF THE STATE
Just as the doctrine of enumerated powers occupies one side of the
94. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527 (1885); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212, 223-24 (1845).
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federalist coin, the concept of the reserved powers of the state, as ar-
ticulated in the tenth amendment and implied from the enumeration of
the federal powers, occupies the other.
The individual states of the Union themselves were never sovereign
in the pure sense of that word.95 This is because, with respect to the
international sphere, states' powers in this field were first held by the
British Crown, then by the Union formed pursuant to the Articles of
Confederation, and finally by the Congress under the Constitution.96
With respect to their internal affairs, however, the states have re-
tained as much power and jurisdiction over individuals and objects
within their geographical bounds as has any foreign nation, except
when that jurisdiction either was surrendered or restrained under the
Constitution itself.97 One of the powers so reserved by the states was
the right to legislate and exercise jurisdiction over their own land.
Records of the debates in both the Congress under the Articles of Con-
federation and the Constitutional Convention show that these were
rights which were jealously guarded by those delegates representing the
component parts of the fledgling nation.98
It is important initially to understand the proposition that the right to
control the property within its own geographical boundaries is implict
in the concept of a "state" itself. Such power is an essential component
in the concept of sovereignty. 99 "Sovereignty and legislature are, in-
deed, convertible terms; one cannot subsist without the other."" No
purpose is served by the creation of a state that does not have the abil-
ity to legislate within its own sphere, including the power to control the
property within that state. Arguably, such an entity is but a paper sov-
ereign. It is land that gives it substance: it is control over that land that
gives it power.
The jurisdiction of a state over its own soil was recognized at an
early date by our courts. The rationale of the initial cases which dealt
with this concept, however, was distorted by subsequent opinions.
95. 1 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 323-24; 1 STORY, supra note 19, at 147-50.
96. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
97. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102, 138 (1837).
98. See notes 7-12 and accompanying text supra. In the deeds of cession during the Confed-
eration period, the landed states specified that the jurisdiction of the United States was to vest on~l
in that western territory ceded; presumably, it was understood that the states were to maintain
control over all soil not ceded to the federal government. Also, initial debates in the Constitu-
tional Convention proposed an abolition of the states entirely, and the creation of a national, and
not afederal government. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 323-25. Needless to say, these pro-
posals never came to fruition. This view also is supported by the fact that there are no public
lands in the original 13 states. See note 62 supra.
99. United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 386-87 (1818).
100. 1 STORY, supra note 19, at 145.
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In the watershed case of Pollard v. Hagan,"°I the Supreme Court was
faced with the question.of whether or not the United States could give
a patent to land encompassing in part the navigable waters of the state
of Alabama. In holding for the right of Alabama to maintain jurisdic-
tion and control over such areas, the Court in part declared that the
shores of navigable waters and the soils beneath them were reserved to
the states and were not ceded to the United States under the Constitu-
tion. It further held that any right the central government might have
had to the public lands gave it no power to grant these lands to the
parties in question.'0 2 It is important to note that the territory that
comprises the state of Alabama was part of the area ceded by post-
colonial Georgia to the new government of the United States, and some
of the real property within the state had been retained by the federal
government after its admission to statehood.
The language of Pollard points to the ability to exert dominion and
control over the landed areas in the states not necessary for federal
enclaves that was among the powers retained by the states under the
tenth amendment and could not be transgressed upon by the federal
sovereign. 103 To quote from Story's Commentaries on the Constitution:
"the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolida-
tion, the State goverments would clearly retain all the rights of sover-
eignty which they had before, and which were not by that act,
exclusively delegated to the United States.'
50 4
The full extent of the holdings in Pollard v. Hagan remained rela-
tively dormant for a number of years. Then, in the early twentieth cen-
tury they reemerged, but with a decided twist in their interpretation. In
these later decisions, the Supreme Court held that what Pollard in fact
had said was that the right of the states to sovereignty and jurisdiction
over unceded lands in effect extended only to those areas consisting of
the shores of navigable waters and the soil beneath them, as a matter of
101. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
102. Id at 230.
103. We, therefore, think the United States hold the public lands within the new states by
force of the deeds of cession, and the statutes connected with them, andnot by any munic-
val sovereignty which it may be supposed they possess, or have reserved by compact with
the new states, for that particular purpose.
Id at 224 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the Court noted:
Alabama is, therefore, entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory
within her limits, subject to the common law, subject to the same extent that Georgia
possessed it before she ceded it to the United States. To maintain any other doctrine, is
to deny that Alabama has been admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the
original states, the constitution, laws, and compact, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id at 228, 229 (emphasis added).
104. 1 STORY, supra note 19, at 322 (emphasis in original).
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right.'0 5 No rationale is given in these cases as to why the Court so
narrowly construed its holdings in these decisions; however, the state of
the law today reflects these misconceptions.
To carry these interpretations to their logical, and perhaps absurd,
conclusion is to maintain that when each territory was admitted into
the Union, the duty of Congress, in terms of necessarily ceded real
property, was to vest in the new state title to only those lands under or
around rivers or lakes within these former territories. This conjures up
the historical possibility of the Congress instituting and creating river-
ine or canal states, with the overwhelming majority of the states' land
being reserved in the federal government. The holdings become even
more ludicrous since the United States has the ability to regulate traffic
on these waterways pursuant to its powers under the Commerce
Clause.'06 Therefore, little or no power would be left to the state over
any of its lands. To interpret the holding in Pollard v. Hagan as con-
templating the institution of such political entities is contrary to all rea-
son, history, and logic.
The inherent right of a state to govern the property within its own
borders pursuant to its sovereign powers also was raised and affirmed
in a non-water rights case, Coyle v. Oklahoma."7 In Coyle, the ques-
tion presented was whether the state of Oklahoma had the power to
relocate its state capitol from Guthrie to Oklahoma City, contrary to
certain provisions of the enabling act which admitted it to statehood.
The Supreme Court held that the ability to make such a change did
exist and was within the power of the state.1
0 8
Relying on Pollard, the Court declared that
when a new State is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with
all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the
original States, and that such powers may not be consiftutionally dimin-
105. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716, 717 (1950); United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19, 30, 31 (1946); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
106. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960); United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940); see The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557 (1870).
107. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
108. "This Union" was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity, and authority,
each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution itself. To maintain otherwise would be to say that the Union,
through the power of the Congress to admit new States, might become a union of States
unequal in power, as including States whose powers were restricted . . . by an act of
Congress accepted as a condition of admission. Thus it would result, first, that the pow-
ers of Congress would not be defined by the Constitution alone, but in respect to new
States, enlarged or restricted by the conditions imposed upon new States by its own
legislation admitting them into the Union; and, second, that such new States might not
exercise all of the powers which had not been delegated by the Constitution, but only
such as had not been further bargained away as conditions of admission.
Id at 567.
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ished, impaired or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipula-
tions embraced in the act under which the new State came into the
Union, which would ndt be valid and effective if the subject of congres-
sional legislation after admission. 109
The language of the above cases points to the fact that the Framers
of the Constitution intended that the states were to control and govern
the land within their borders, independent of interference from sister
states or the central government. It is doubtful that a constitution
which proposed any other scheme of real property control would have
been drafted at the Constitutional Convention and later adopted by the
people of the former colonies." 0
No one would dream of postulating, for example, that California
should be able to dictate to Nevada how the latter should legislate over
its lands or, worse yet, send California state employees into Nevada to
manage these areas pursuant to California law. The control currently
exerted by the federal government does not differ conceptually from
this illustration. Such an infringement upon the sovereign powers of a
state is destructive to our system of government and stands on dubious
constitutional grounds. Based on the preceding discussions of the
proprietorial role of the federal government and the reserved powers of
the state, this article will suggest that there is no Constitutional author-
ity for the agreements that were imposed upon the states wherein they
agreed at the time of admission to retention of Article IV public land
by the federal government.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CESSION OF
PUBLIC LANDS
Crucial to any discussion involving the power of the federal govern-
ment to implement and pass legislation, to enter into compacts, or to
accept grants of land, is whether that power is contained expressly in
the Constitution, or whether it can be deemed to exist as part of the
"necessary and proper" powers given to enable it to perform its enu-
merated functions.
There is no basis for the cession of land from the states to the federal
government for anything but enumerated purposes. The ability of the
federal goverment to accept real property, other than that which is to
be used for Article I purposes, does not exist by virtue of its right to
contract, nor from its right to acquire territory. Furthermore, the
power is not contained in the words of the Constitution and is in fact
109. Id at 573 (emphasis added).
110. MADISON, supra note 14, at 487-93.
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refuted by records of the Congress under the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitutional Convention, and by basic concepts of federalism
itself.
A. The Power to Contract
It has been stated that the various enabling acts which admitted the
territories into the Union and which contained provisions for reserva-
tion of the public lands by the United States constituted agreements
that were in themselves sufficient to vest the Congress with regulatory
powers over these areas."' There are, however, a number of argu-
ments that refute such a position.
Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress given the ability to contract
with an individual state regarding any matter. Although the courts
have held that this ability does exist in certain circumstances, such deci-
sions have been based upon concepts of the right of the United States
to act in its own sovereign capacity." 2 One such area has been in the
field of federal funding, upheld under the necessary and proper clause,
as applied to the taxing and spending power." 3 Therefore, the right of
the United States to contract is not denied tf it is in the exercise of an
enumerated power.
The Constitution is silent about the ability of the federal government
to expand its enumerated powers in derogation of the reserved powers
of the state by contract or agreement. It is also silent about the power
of both the state and federal governments acting in concert to effect
such a transformation. Such an ability would circumvent, and is there-
fore repugnant to, the existence of a written constitution) 4
The concept of federal-state compacts, as it pertains to this discus-
sion, very plainly means that the Constitution does not empower the
federal government to contract with, or obtain the consent of, the legis-
latures of the territories for purposes of denying those political entities
the power to exert sovereign and jurisdictional control over their soil
once they have become states.
Such an argument is supported by the words of the Article IV prop-
erty clause itself. It should be noted that there is no language which
allows the federal government to retain any lands on the basis of the
consent of the states in Article IV, section 3, clause 2. Although con-
111. GATES, supra note 24, at 317. See also Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244, 245
(1900).
112. 2 STORY, supra note 19, at 143.
113. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
114. Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 109 (1918); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224
(1845).
1981 / Federal Ownershp of Public Lands
sent was made a component to the acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction
by the federal government over Article I property and to the creation of
a new state within the boundaries of existing states in the first clause of
Article IV, such a consent provision is glaringly absent in the Article IV
property clause with regard to "territory or other property." Therefore,
the obtaining of the consent of the states to retention of their land by
the federal government is irrelevant with respect to the Article IV pub-
lic lands."
15
That these inherent powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction were rec-
ognized by the Congress of the United States itself is implied from the
contents of the various organic acts mentioned. The agreements carry
within themselves the seeds of their own contradiction. If the federal
government did not realize that the individual states' power of sover-
eignty, which included the right of jurisdiction over the land within
their geographical boundaries, existed, then why in each instance did it
move by cessions or reservation of certain parcels of land to the United
States to exclude it? If the power of the central government to exercise
continuing control over those areas which were not given to the states
was complete, it would have been unnecessary to compel each individ-
ual state to enter into an agreement confirming those rights. If the con-
stitutional ability to retain the lands existed, it was complete in itself.
No compact between the state and federal governments would have
been necessary since any such agreement was superfluous in terms of
conferring or confirming a power already vested. Conversely, if such a
power was not granted to the Congress under the Constitution, no
agreement, even between the respective sovereigns, could validly or ef-
fectively create it. 1
6
Although the Congress may exact from the territories whatever con-
ditions it deems appropriate to their admission as states pursuant to its
discretion to admit new members into the Union, once they have been
included, the federal government cannot deny to them any of the privi-
leges and immunities which the other states enjoy.' 1 There are, in fact,
a number of cases that have held that once the states have gained ad-
mission, they can abrogate or ignore any such conditions." 8 Although
115. [I]f an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement, granting the munici-
pal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would
have been void and inoperative; because the United States have no constitutional capac-
ity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits
of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.
44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
116. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 580 (1847); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S.
(10 Pet.) 662, 735 (1836).
117. W.W. WILLOUGHBY, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 264 (1978).
118. See, eg., Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 89 (1900); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S.
678, 688 (1882); Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 (1845).
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the cases have dealt primarily with concepts pertaining to the "politi-
car' rights of the states, there appears to be no good cause, particularly
in view of the above arguments pertaining to the power to form fed-
eral-state compacts, why this rule should not include the right of a state
to exert sovereign control over the real property within its borders.
Therefore, any retentions of Article IV property in the states by the
federal government must have their bases in the powers given to the
Congress itself and cannot be predicated upon the above-mentioned
compacts with the states. Its origin must be found in the body of the
Constitution and cannot stem from the adoption of the various organic
acts between the state and central governments.
If the acts imparting statehood were insufficient to vest legal title to
these areas in the federal government, we must turn to the language
and history of the Constitution itself to examine possible sources of this
power.
B. The Power to Acquire Territory
The ability of the United States to acquire territory by gift, conquest,
purchase, annexation, or bequest is vested in it by the Constitution, as
well as being within its powers as a sovereign nation in its own right.' 19
The Congress has the legal duty and obligation to ensure that it divest
itself of these areas and admit the territory as a member of the Union
of States once Congress finds the territory is capable of assuming the
responsibilities of statehood.' 20 The power to admit new states into the
federal union is one expressly given to the Congress under Article IV,
section 3, clause 1. A provision for the retention of property in a former
territory after its admission as a state, other than for the existence of
federal enclaves, appears nowhere in the constitutional structure.
21
It is therefore clear that the United States, although empowered to
119. See National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 132 (1879); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
120. W.W. WILLOUGHBY, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 263-64 (1978).
121. These propositions were set forth by Chief Justice Roger Taney:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to
establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled
and governed at its own pleasures; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except
by the admission of new States. That power is plainly given; and if a new State is admit-
ted, it needs no further legislation by Congress, because the Constitution itself defines the
relative rights and powers, and the duties of the States, and the citizens of the States, and
the Federal Government. But no power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and
governedpermanently in that character.... It is acquired to become a State, and not to
be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority; and the propriety
of admitting a new State is committed to the sound discretion of Congress, the power to
acquire territory for that purpose, to be held by the United States until it is in a suitable
condition to become a State upon an equal footing with the other States, must rest upon
the same discretion.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 446-47 (1856) (emphasis added).
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acquire territory, also is mandated to organize such acquisitions into
new states for purposes of inclusion into the federal union: "The
United States do [sic] not and cannot hold property, as a monarch may,
for private or personal purposes. ' 22 The issue that therefore arises is:
where has the United States been granted the power to maintain con-
trol over property in the former territories after their admission to
statehood? Or, which specific Constitutional provision entitles the cen-
tral government to act in the capacity of a proprietor over such areas?
The ability of the United States to retain these landholdings after ad-
mission of a state to the Union either must appear in the Contitution
among its enumerated powers or must be "necessary and proper" to
carry out one or more of those powers. If such an ability does not ap-
pear in the Constitution, it does not exist.
C. The "Territory or Other Property" Clause
The clause under which this power generally is deemed to be vested
is Article IV, section 3, clause 2.123 The power to maintain continuing
jurisdiction over the public lands arguably could originate from this
clause which gives Congress power to make all needful rules and regu-
lations "respecting the territory or other property" of the United States.
The power, however, cannot be deemed to have been vested by the
right to acquire or regulate the territory of the United States due to the
command to form these areas into new states. "Territory," taken in its
logical and grammatical context, only refers to the real property owned
by the United States while in a territorial status.
Taking this argument a step further, the word "territory" must be
interpreted as meaning only that property for which title is vested in
the government of the United States for purposes of its formation into
new states, and not as meaning territory in its general sense or any real
property belonging to the federal entity.124 The power therefore logi-
cally stems from the ability of Congress to regulate the "other prop-
erty" of the United States. As late as 1906, some 115 years after the
ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court itself stated that
"[t]he full scope of this paragraph has never been definitely settled."
1 21
If the term "other property of the United States" can be seen as refer-
ring to the public lands, then arguably there is a legitimate claim to the
federal power to control these areas. There are two arguments, how-
ever, which serve to invalidate such a claim.
122. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158 (1886).
123. See note 92 supra.
124. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1642 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
125. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907).
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The first of these is the historical fact that, at the time of the framing
of the Constitution, two states, North Carolina and Georgia, had not
ceded their western territory to the government of the United States,
although it was anticipated that they would do so. Therefore, these
unceded areas properly could not be classified as "territory" of the
United States, but rather were in a state of jurisdictional limbo, as far
as control by the United States was concerned, until ceded. A strong
argument can therefore be made that the words "other property" were
inserted in the phrase to specify the status of these unceded lands.' 26
This argument is further supported by the fact that at the Constitu-
tional Convention the original resolution pertaining to these areas, as
submitted to the Committee of Detail, contained language empowering
the new government "[t]o dispose of the unappropriated lands of the
United States."' 27 The Article IV property clause was the end result of
this resolution.
Moreover, there is evidence to show that at least some of the Framers
of the Constitution anticipated that the jurisdiction of the United States
eventually would span the Mississippi and extend to the western
ocean.' 28 Although the fire of Manifest Destiny did not burn in the
nation as a whole in 1787, its tinder was set in the minds of the more
far-sighted of its founders. The term "other property" was thus also
conceivably penned to provide for those areas across the Mississippi
that could come eventually under this country's control.
The second argument deals with the relative juxtaposition of the
three different property clauses in the Constitution. An analysis of the
order in which these three clauses appear provides an aid in compre-
hending the powers of state and nation within the federal structure as
they pertain to the governing of real property within the limits of the
United States. Article I, section 8, clause 17 is contained in that area of
the Constitution dealing with specific powers granted exclusively to
Congress, deemed necessary to the implementation of an effective sys-
tem of central government. Article IV, section 3, clause 1 and clause 2,
on the other hand, are contained in that area of the founding document
that deals with the relative positions of the state and central govern-
ments within the federalist system. These two clauses, when read to-
gether, clearly show that the ultimate purpose of these provisions of the
Constitution was to establish a format for the inclusion of new states
126. D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE 409-10 (1978); Patterson, TheRelation ofthe
Federal Government to the States in Landholding, 28 TEx. L. REv. 54 (1949). See also Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 610-15 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
127. 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 321.
128. 3 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 401, containing the letter of Governeur Morris to Henry W.
Livingston, dated November 25, 1803.
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into the Union and to empower Congress to regulate these areas prior
to statehood.
In this context, an interpretation of "other property" as meaning that
the United States has the power to withhold public lands at the time of
admission and to regulate the public lands after admission to statehood
is glaringly misplaced. If this power were to have been vested in the
central government, it could have been inserted logically and easily
among the specific powers given to Congress in Article I. It was not so
inserted because it was felt that the federal government should own no
property for any purpose other than for the implementation of its enu-
merated functions. To argue that the power to own other types of
property exists in the Article IV property clauses is to stretch constitu-
tional interpretation to the breaking point.
Finally, with respect to Article IV, the phrase "territory or other
property," when read in reference to the remainder of the clause,
clearly shows that they are to be treated coequally. In other words, it
matters not whether you classify the land as "territory" or "other prop-
erty"; they are both to be dealt with in the same manner, namely to be
formed into states for purposes of admission into the Union. There-
fore, if the United States cannot hold "territory" in a permanent na-
ture, neither can it hold "other property" in such a fashion. Hence, the
right to regulate land "in the territories" does not equal the right to
regulate land "in the states."'
' 29
D. The Mandate to Dispose
Reservation by the federal government of public lands in the states
raises additional questions about the constitutionality of such holdings
under the provisions of the Article IV property clause. This clause does
not empower the federal government to "own and dispose" of the other
property belonging to the United States, but merely gives it authority to
"dispose" of these lands. Both history and recent legislation have
shown that it has been a policy of the United States that certain public
lands be retained in federal ownership and pass out of that ownership
only at the complete discretion of the central authority. It is submitted
that no rule of constitutional construction can alter, interpret, or con-
strue the mandate to "dispose" to include the power to "retain" perma-
nently, as is the enunciated policy of the federal government.
The theory of retention is further refuted by the one universal propo-
sition that was argued and accepted from the period of cession during
the Confederation period, through the Constitutional Convention, and
129. See notes 7-11 supra.
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ultimately to the debates over ratification. This proposition was that
the public lands ceded to the United States were to be sold to offset the
national debt incurred as a result of the Revolutionary War and ulti-
mately were to be formed into independent republican states. James
Madison, one of the chief architects of the Constitution, wrote that the
western lands were to be used to discharge the domestic debts of the
country and provide revenue to the federal treasury for only "a certain
period." '3 Such evidence indicates that any policy of retention by the
federal government contravenes the intent of the Framers with regard
to the public lands.
F The New States Clause
Another argument against the legality of continued federal retention
and control of the public lands revolves around the New States clause,
contained in Article IV, section 3, clause 1. This. provision of the Con-
stitution prohibits the creation of any state within the boundaries of an
already existing state or states without the consent of the legislature of
the states concerned and of the Congress.
An integral component in the creation of a "state" involves the right
to legislate over the governing of the lands within that state. Arguably,
the federal policy has elevated the public lands into the equivalent of
vast federal enclaves not merely owned, but also managed by the cen-
tral government, with comprehensive legislation that dictates the land's
permissible uses. In doing so, the federal government has effectively
created a vast federal protectorate that is independent of the jurisdic-
tion of the states in which these lands exist and is exempt from state
regulation and control.
Such jurisdiction by Congress is tantamount to the creation of fed-
eral states within the boundaries of already existing states, accom-
plished without the consent of the states concerned. The creation of
such federal entities therefore would appear contrary to the provisions
of the Article IV property clause.
An issue conceivably could be raised that the consent of the states to
the creation of such federal bodies was, in fact, obtained by the adop-
tion of the enabling acts which admitted each territory into the Union.
There are, however, a number of arguments which serve to refute such
a position.
In each of these acts, the territorial governments agreed to vest title
to the unceded lands in the United States and not to interfere "with the
130. THE FEDERALIST No. 38.
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primary disposar' of these lands by the central authority.' 3 ' The terri-
tories entered into no agreement consenting to permanent retention of
those lands by the federal government. Moreover, it is questionable in
simple contract terms whether the obtaining of consent to retain the
lands was effective upon ratification of the various organic acts, based
upon concepts of coercion and lack of consideration on the part of the
United States. According to this analysis, the agreements by the terri-
torial legislatures to surrender the lands as a condition precedent to
obtaining statehood were void ab initio because they arguably were en-
tered into under duress. The only alternatives presented were to agree
to the retention of the land by the federal government or remain a terri-
tory.
Furthermore, in admitting the new states, Congress was performing
a duty that it clearly had an obligation to perform under the Constitu-
tion. In exacting the requirement that certain lands be given to the
federal government prior to the admission of new states, there was no
bargained-for exchange between the two sovereigns; in return for their
lands the states acquired only that which was already theirs under the
provisions of the Constitution.
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, even if the consent to such
cessions is deemed to be effective, it has previously been shown that no
agreement, although entered into between the state and federal govern-
ments themselves, can operate to create a power in the Congress not
vested by the Constitution. Therefore, the deeds of cession which
granted the public lands to the United States were void if the Congress
had no constitutional power to receive these lands from the states.
Thus, no power appears in the Constitution to allow the Congress to
transform these areas into huge quasi-colonies to be governed at the
whim of the federal government. Such a scheme of property jurisdic-
tion never was contemplated by the founders and cannot be deemed to
have been created by the consent of the states.
132
G. The Articles of Confederation
Yet another point refuting the "proprietor" argument is centered
around the powers formerly given to the United States in the Articles
of Confederation. Under the Articles, the central government was not
entitled to hold any property in the states even for its governmental
seat. The reason for this limitation was the fear in the minds of the
recent colonials that such an ability could lead to the creation of a mas-
131. See note 25 supra.
132. MADISON, supra note 14, at 487-93.
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sive and uncontrollable sovereign, similar to the one that had been
overthrown in the Revolutionary War.
33
The Constitutional Convention originally had been called for the
purposes of curing the defects that existed in the Articles of Confedera-
tion. On this basis, it surely can be said that if the founders intended
for the central government to own any property, other than for federal
enclaves, such a power would have been expressly stated and inserted
into the body of the founding document.
H. The Constitutional Debates
The Congressional ability to retain these lands also is refuted by the
records we have of the debates in the Constitutional Convention. It is
clear from these records that the delegates feared that the acquisition
power under Article I could subject the individual members of the
Union to the will of a powerful sovereign. Hence, they inserted the
provision requiring such acquisitions to be made "with the consent of
the State"'34 in order to limit the power. The Article IV property
clause contains no such consent provision with regard to the phrase
"territory or other property." It does not seem logical to assume that
these same delegates would have sanctioned federal control over state
land in regard to Article IV property without requiring the consent of
the states when they made consent an express condition with regard to
Article I property.
Z Concepts of Federalism
Finally, to argue that the federal government has the constitutional
ability to vest in itself the title to huge tracts of land within the former
colonies, in derogation of the inherent rights of the respective states to
control these areas, is opposed to all logical concepts of federalism. No
purpose would be served by allowing the federal government to own
land independent of its enumerated functions. Nor would any purpose
be served by creating a state if its landed area is dominated by the
federal government. If the federal government has the right to retain
control over territories in perpetuity, it has more power over these
lands after their admission to statehood than it hadprior to their inclu-
sion in the Union of States. This result directly conflicts with the con-
stitutional mandate to create new states. Obeying this constitutional
133. See notes 20-21 supra. See also 2 FARRAND, supra note 20, at 509 (regarding appropria-
tions for a national army).
134. See notes 20-21 supra.
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command in name only, while in fact maintaining control over these
areas as quasi-colonies, is a blatant exaltation of form over substance.
The constitutional interpretations that have given the federal govern-
ment the right to exercise continuing jurisdiction over state land have
conferred upon the United States the status of a sovereign in this re-
gard, in derogation of the sovereignty of the respective states. Such an
interpretation distorts the concept of federalism from that of a union of
states which comprise a central government to one of a confederation of
states which are united with a central government.
In other words, we are presently a united entity composed of 50
states, each independent of the other, with its own legislative, judicial,
and executive branches, and which elects officials who are sent to repre-
sent our interests in a national forum. We are not a nation of 63 states
with the additional sovereigns being the Federal States of Alaska, Ne-
vada, California, and so on, which consist of non-enclave federal lands
ruled by Congress and administered by various federal agencies. Such
a union was never conceived by the Framers. The propriety of the
evolution of such a system should be seriously questioned by both the
federal and state governments.
The above arguments suggest that nowhere in the Constitution is
there either an express or an implied power of the Congress to regulate
or exercise jurisdictional control over the real property contained
within the geographical boundaries of a state after its admission into
the Union other than for uses as Article I property. Therefore, the abil-
ity of a state to exert self-rule over land within its boundaries must
devolve to the state immediately upon its admission to the Union as
part of that residuum of power maintained by the states under the tenth
amendment.
CONCLUSION
This article has suggested that the federal government was conceived
and is to be maintained as one of enumerated powers. Although sover-
eign in the international sphere, it is limited with regard to internal
matters to those powers given to it under the Constitution. The powers
of the states are equally sovereign and supreme within the sphere re-
served to them under the Constitution. History, constitutional interpre-
tation, and early case law show that the ability of the states to exert
jurisdiction and control over the lands within their geographical
boundaries was among those powers reserved to the states under the
tenth amendment. With the exception of those areas reserved as fed-
eral enclaves, the individual states, not the federal government, accede
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to all rights of sovereignty and general governmental jurisdiction over
lands within their borders immediately upon admission to statehood.
It is clear from the Constitution, as it has been consistently interpreted
by case law, that exclusive federal governmental jurisdiction and legis-
lation pass to the United States only in relation to Article I property
that has been given to the federal government with the consent of the
state in which the property is situated. No such power is given by the
Constitution with respect to Article IV property. The original intention
of the founding fathers has been eroded over the past 150 years to the
point where the United States now exerts sovereign control over public
lands in the states. Nonetheless, there is no express provision in the
Constitution authorizing the exercise of proprietorial powers by the
federal government over Article IV property in the states. Recent legis-
lation that allows the Congress to retain, manage, and control the pub-
liec lands represents a culmination of errors in this field of the law and is
an impermissible extension of federal power over an area reserved to
the states under the Constitution. The Founders originally sought to
create an indestructible Union composed of indestructible states.
When that purpose is ignored, although we may still remain one na-
tion, our Union will not be the Union of the Constitution. 135
135. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 579-80 (1911).
